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 LAW OF THE INTERMEDIATED INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE 
 
Jacqueline D. Lipton* 
 
Abstract 
 
When Wikipedia, Google and other online service providers 
staged a ‘blackout protest’ against the Stop Online Piracy Act 
in January 2012, their actions inadvertently emphasized a 
fundamental truth that is often missed about the nature of 
cyberlaw.  In attempts to address what is unique about the 
field, commentators have failed to appreciate that the field 
could – and should – be reconceputalized as a law of the 
global intermediated information exchange.  Such a conception 
would provide a set of organizing principles that are lacking in 
existing scholarship.  Nothing happens online that does not 
involve one or more intermediaries – the service providers who 
facilitate all digital commerce and communication by 
providing the hardware and software through which all 
interactions take place.  This Article advocates a fundamental 
shift in the nature of cyberspace scholarship towards a law of 
the ‘intermediated information exchange.’  The author explains 
the benefits of such an approach in developing a more 
predictable and cohesive body of legal principles to govern 
cyberspace interactions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The January 2012 ‘blackout protest’ against the Stop Online Piracy Act 
(SOPA) mounted by Wikipedia, Google, and other online service providers1 
brings into sharp relief what is unique about cyberlaw as a legal field.  The 
current SOPA bill2 is the most recent example of the ongoing battle 
between market players and lawmakers in attempting to delineate the 
boundaries of legal responsibility for wrongful online conduct. As a 
longtime casebook author and teacher of cyberlaw, I have struggled, along 
with many of my colleagues, to provide a cohesive theoretical framework 
for the study of the subject.  In a typical law school course, professors 
usually start out with general questions relating to the nature of cyberspace 
and the impact of the technology on the development of legal regulation.  
Invariably this leads to a discussion of Judge Easterbrook’s infamous 
dismissal of cyberlaw as nothing more than a cyber ‘law of the horse’ that 
fails to illuminate the entire law in a meaningful way because it has no 
unifying features.3 
 
What is easy to miss about cyberlaw – and what the battle over SOPA 
brings to the forefront of the debates – is that the field is, in reality, the law 
of the intermediated information exchange.  All online interactions – social, 
commercial, academic, artistic – are exchanges of information facilitated by 
one or more third party intermediaries.  These third parties include search 
engines, payments systems, Internet service providers (ISPs), gaming 
platforms, social network operators, domain name registrars, and web 
hosting services.  Nothing can happen online that does not involve one or 
more of these actors.  Moreover, it is the struggle to address the legal role of 
these actors with respect to online wrongs that creates the law and policy 
challenges that are unique to cyberspace.   
 
The law of cyberspace is in reality the law of the intermediated 
information exchange transacted on a global stage.  This realization 
suggests that the dual foci of cyberspace law should be: (a) the role and 
                                                 
1
  For discussion of the protest, see, for example, Amy Goodman, The SOPA Blackout 
Protest Makes History, The Guardian, January 18, 2012 (available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/jan/18/sopa-blackout-protest-
makes-history, last viewed on February 8, 2012). 
2
  H.R. 3261 1H (112 Cong.), text available at:  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c112:H.R.3261:, last viewed on February 8, 2012). 
3
   Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U CHI LEGAL F 
207, 207-208 (1996). 
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regulation of online intermediaries; and, (b) associated jurisdictional 
challenges.  This Article sets out a new theoretical framework for cyberlaw 
that is more cohesive and principled than the current piecemeal approaches 
found in most casebooks.4  
 
Part I critiques existing approaches to cyberlaw and explains why 
current paradigms fail to serve the needs of the field as it has developed 
over the last ten to fifteen years.  The author suggests that past scholarship 
has missed the mark in failing to focus on what is truly unique about 
cyberspace – its nature as a global intermediated communications medium.  
Part II suggests novel ways for re-organizing the field to focus on the role 
of online intermediaries in a global communications environment.  Part III 
examines jurisdictional challenges that are unique to cyberspace and 
suggests ways in which they might be appropriately addressed within a 
reconceptualized cyberlaw field. Part IV concludes by drawing together the 
issues raised in Parts II and III in order to formulate a new approach to the 
field with significantly more internal cohesion than has been the case in the 
past. 
 
I.   CURRENT CONCEPTIONS OF CYBERLAW  
 
Despite the resilience of cyberlaw as a staple in today’s law school 
curricula, no one has yet accurately explained the nature of the field.  It has 
been in the face of uncertainties surrounding its boundaries that casebook 
writers (myself included) began to organize the debate around the infamous 
‘law of the horse’ categorization of cyberspace law offered by Judge Frank 
Easterbrook in 1996,5 and the response to Easterbrook penned soon after by 
eminent cyberspace scholar, Professor Lawrence Lessig.6   
 
In remarks prepared following an invitation to comment on property law 
in cyberspace in the 1990s, Judge Easterbrook likened cyberspace law to a 
cyber “law of the horse”.  He noted that courses involving the cross-
sterilization of several fields, such as law and technology, tended to offer 
the worst of both worlds.7  They would be doomed to be taught by 
professors who “knew little about either field”.8  He further opined that the 
most effective way to learn laws as they might apply to specialized 
                                                 
4
  See discussion in Part I, infra. 
5
  Easterbrook, supra note 3. 
6
  Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:  What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 501 (1999). 
7
  Easterbrook, supra note  3, at 207. 
8
  Id. 
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endeavors is to study rules of general application.9  Otherwise, any new 
field that emerged would lack unifying principles that might illuminate 
anything meaningful about the law more generally.10 
 
In his oft-cited response to Easterbrook, Professor Lawrence Lessig 
claimed that cyberlaw did, in fact, illuminate the entire law, although not in 
the way described by Easterbrook.11  Lessig acknowledged that cyberlaw 
might be conceived as a series of disconnected tort, contract, and 
intellectual property problems as a matter of substance.12  However, he 
noted that: “there is an important general point that comes from thinking in 
particular about how law and cyberspace connect.”13  This general point 
was not about the substance of the law as it might be applied in cyberspace, 
but rather about the limits on law as a regulator.14 
 
Lessig utilized this insight as a springboard for his well-known work on 
the application of multiple regulatory modalities to cyberspace.  These 
modalities include law, social norms, markets, and system architecture.15  
Lessig’s work has emphasized the significance of system architecture, or 
software code, as the key regulatory modality for cyberspace.  He has noted 
that online behavior can be more or less completely and almost perfectly 
regulated by software code to an extent that could never be paralleled by 
legal rules, which are often poorly understood and imperfectly enforced.16   
 
                                                 
9
   Id. 
10
  Id., at 207-8. 
11
  Lessig, supra note 6. 
12
  Id, at 502 (“Courses in law school, Easterbrook argued, ‘should be limited to 
subjects that could illuminate the entire law.’ ‘[T]he best way to learn the law applicable to 
specialized endeavors,’ he argued, ‘is to study general rules.’  This ‘the law of cyberspace,’ 
conceived of as torts in cyberspace, contracts in cyberspace, property in cyberspace, etc., 
was not.”) 
13
  Id. 
14
  Id. 
15
 Id., at 503-504 (identifying these four modalities of regulation in both physical 
world and cyberspace contexts). 
16
  Id., at 514 (“I argued that whether cyberspace can be regulated is not a function of 
Nature. It depends, instead, upon its architecture, or its code. Its regulability, that is, is a 
function of its design.”); Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica:  The Formulation of 
Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 555 (1998) (“This 
Article argues, in essence, that the set of rules for information flows imposed by 
technology and communication networks form a ‘Lex Informatica’ that policymakers must 
understand, consciously recognize, and encourage”); 556 (“policymakers can and should 
look to Lex Informatica as a useful extra-legal instrument that may be used to achieve 
objectives that otherwise challenge conventional laws and attempts by governments to 
regulate across jurisdictional lines”). 
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The tendency to focus cyberlaw scholarship on the Easterbrook-Lessig 
debate in subsequent years has become problematic for two reasons.  The 
first is that it effectively freezes the debate within conceptions of the 
Internet as it existed in the early to mid 1990s.  Little attempt has been 
made by subsequent scholars to move the debate towards more modern 
conceptions of the Internet.  In other words, the debate as framed today 
tends to lack the benefit of hindsight, the ability to look at what the Internet 
has become and what unique legal issues have arisen in cyberspace since 
Easterbrook and Lessig presented their early comments.   
 
The second drawback of relying on the Easterbrook-Lessig debate as an 
organizing focus for the modern study of cyberlaw is that such an approach 
tends to polarize scholars into two camps – those who believe that cyberlaw 
is not really a field of law at all, and those who believe that cyberlaw is a 
field that involves the complex interplay of multiple regulatory modalities 
of which software code is perhaps the most significant.17  While aspects of 
each point of view are undoubtedly correct, scholars have tended to avoid 
developing alternate explanations for cyberspace law.18 
 
Paradoxically, in the meantime, other important areas of cyberlaw 
scholarship have evolved, including a body of literature about the extent to 
which spatial metaphors derived from the physical world could – or should 
– be meaningfully applied to cyberspace.19  Another ongoing debate has 
focused on the regulatory competence of domestic governments over the 
Internet.20  Important as these bodies of scholarship have unquestionably 
become, they do not answer the most foundational questions about the 
                                                 
17
  See supra note 16. 
18
  There have been some exceptions to this general trend.  See, for example, Raymond 
Ku, A Brave New Cyberworld? 22 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 125 (2000); Ira Nathenson, Best 
Practices for the Law of the Horse:  Teaching Cyberlaw and Illuminating Law Through 
Online Simulations, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER AND HIGH TECH. L. J. ___ (forthcoming, 
2012). 
19
  See, for example, John Perry Barlow, Cyberspace Declaration of Independence 
(1996) (available at https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html, last viewed on 
August 1, 2011); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital 
Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439 (2003); Mark Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. 
L. REV. 521 (2003); Jacqueline Lipton, Mixed Metaphors in Cyberspace:  Property in 
Information and Information Systems, 35 U. CHI. L. J. 235 (2003); Julie Cohen, Cyberspace 
As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007). 
20
  See, for example, JACK GOLDSMITH and TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET:  
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2008) (arguing that national governments can and 
do regulate cyberspace effectively); DAVID POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE:  
NOTES ON THE STUDY OF CYBERSPACE (2009) (arguing against domestic governments 
regulating cyberspace). 
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nature and contours of cyberlaw as a legal field.   
 
This Article argues that scholars can and should revisit the debate about 
the nature of cyberlaw with the benefit of hindsight, the ability to examine 
pertinent legal developments, and marketplace advances, since the early 
Easterbrook-Lessig debates.  Common unifying threads for the field have 
emerged if one is prepared to tease them out.  They arise from the fact that 
the Internet is a global communications forum above all else and that all 
Internet interaction must be facilitated by third party intermediaries.  Thus, 
a conception of cyberlaw that focuses on its global nature and on the role of 
these intermediaries will provide the unified framework that Easterbrook 
felt was lacking in 1996. 
 
Additionally, while Lessig was undoubtedly correct in conceiving of 
cyberlaw as involving an interaction between various online regulatory 
modalities – including laws, social norms, market forces, and software 
code21 – there is still a need within the literature for a conception of 
cyberlaw that focuses on the legal aspect of this equation.  In the real world, 
law always interacts with other modes of regulation.  Our behavior in the 
tangible universe is constrained as much by physical fences and walls and 
social mores as it is by legal rules.22  This is no different in cyberspace, 
other than the fact that the precise content of the norms and the nature of the 
system constraints may vary online from those we face in the real world.   
 
It is imperative that scholars engage with Internet law as a specific 
endeavor outside the interaction of the law with other modes of online 
regulation.  Lessig and others may well be correct in suggesting that system 
architecture is a more effective regulator of online behavior than legal 
rules.23  But that is no reason not to develop the legal rules appropriately 
within the context of a more cohesive theoretical framework.  In the real 
world, prison bars and guards with guns provide more effective constraints 
on the behavior of convicted criminals than sentencing laws.  But that is no 
                                                 
21
  Lessig, supra note 6, at 507-8. 
22
  Id. (“And finally, there is a fourth feature of real space that regulates behavior – 
‘architecture.’ By ‘architecture’ I mean the physical world as we find it, even if ‘as we find 
it’ is simply how it has already been made. That a highway divides two neighborhoods 
limits the extent to which the neighborhoods integrate. That a town has a square, easily 
accessible with a diversity of shops, increases the integration of residents in that town. That 
Paris has large boulevards limits the ability of revolutionaries to protest. That the 
Constitutional Court in Germany is in Karlsruhe, while the capital is in Berlin, limits the 
influence of one branch of government over the other. These constraints function in a way 
that shapes behavior. In this way, they too regulate.”) 
23
  See supra note 16. 
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reason not to maintain a body of sentencing law.   
 
The aim of this article is to renew and refocus debates on the nature of 
cyberlaw.  The key features of the Internet for the purposes of this 
discussion are: (a) all online conduct involves information exchange as 
opposed to physical contact;24 (b) all online communications are facilitated 
by one or more Internet intermediaries such as ISPs, search engines, gaming 
platforms, and payments systems; and, (c) most online interaction has at 
least the potential for global reach. 
 
No one can interact online without contracting with an ISP.  The 
Internet experience is only meaningful in terms of interactions, all of which 
must be facilitated by intermediaries such as Facebook,25 Flickr,26 
MySpace,27 Shutterfly,28 Amazon,29 and Google30.  Internet intermediaries 
appear at many points within the online experience, and they are necessary 
to enable all online experiences. 
 
The fact that everything on the Internet may be described as an 
intermediated information exchange ultimately sets the parameters for 
cyberlaw, and sets cyberlaw apart as a distinct legal field.  Understanding 
cyberlaw means understanding the nature and regulation of an information 
exchange involving more than just the originator and the recipient of a 
communication.  One must further consider the impact of the global nature 
of the Internet on all of these issues.  As most Internet disputes have the 
potential to raise jurisdictional concerns, there is a high risk within 
                                                 
24
  The information exchange is made possible by hardware and by electrons passing 
through cables, but my suggested focus for cyberlaw is on the informational qualities of the 
exchange rather than the hardware.  A good discussion of confusion between hardware and 
content-based analyses of the Internet that plagued early discussions of Internet law can be 
found in:  Orin Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357 (2003). 
25
  Facebook is a popular online social networking service.  See www.facebook.com, 
last viewed on August 1, 2011. 
26
 Flickr is an online photo-sharing service.  See www.flickr.com, last viewed on 
August 1, 2011. 
27
  MySpace is a social networking service and forum for sharing popular culture.  See 
www.myspace.com, last viewed on August 1, 2011. 
28
  Shutterfly is an electronic business engaging in printing photographs and associated 
merchandise for customers as well as providing platforms for sharing photographs.  See 
www.shutterfly.com, last viewed on August 1, 2011. 
29
  Amazon.com is an iconic early experiment in electronic commerce that started as a 
book and music retailer online and has grown to expand into various different kinds of 
online marketplaces.  See www.amazon.com, last viewed on August 1, 2011. 
30
   Google is probably the world’s leading search engine.  See www.google.com, last 
viewed on August 1, 2011. 
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cyberlaw that the prominence of jurisdictional issues may detract from the 
development of substantive legal rules.  It is to these issues that the 
remainder of this discussion now turns.     
 
II.  INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES  
 
A.  Defining Online Intermediaries 
 
For the purposes of this discussion, Internet intermediaries include any 
service provider that enables online interaction through either paid 
subscription or general availability to the public.31  These intermediaries 
will all maintain distinct business models.  They may make their money 
through subscription fees, through collecting user information and 
marketing it to other parties, through advertising, or through a combination 
of these approaches.  However, the common feature is that they enable and 
facilitate online communications in many spheres – commercial, personal, 
social, artistic, academic etc. 
 
Without intermediaries, no one could go online or do much of anything 
by way of online activity.  Intermediaries thus play a powerful and 
important role.  Where one intermediary holds a dominant position in a 
relevant niche – such as Google for online searching or Facebook for social 
networking – the power of that intermediary may warrant significant 
scrutiny.32 
 
Identifying the role of Internet intermediaries in terms of their legal 
responsibilities is in many ways the foundational challenge of cyberlaw.  
The legal challenges that are unique to cyberspace law and that differentiate 
cyberlaw from other fields arise from the ways in which, and extent to 
which, legislatures and courts are prepared to impose liability on 
intermediaries for online conduct initiated by others.33  The focal position of 
                                                 
31
  Jacqueline Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”:  Developing a Privacy Paradigm for 
Digital Video, 95 IOWA L REV 919, 931-932 (2010) (distinguishing between closed 
networks that require individual membership and open networks which are generally 
accessible to the public). 
32
  See, for example, JANET LOWE, GOOGLE SPEAKS:  SECRETS OF THE WORLD’S 
GREATEST BILLIONAIRE ENTREPRENEURS, SERGEY BRIN AND LARRY PAGE, 10 (2009) 
(noting that as Google gained market share and power, it also gained negative publicity for 
becoming too powerful); Facebook has attracted much criticism for its lack of privacy 
protections for users.  See, for example, Rory Cellan-Jones, Facebook Faces Criticism on 
Privacy Change, BBC News, Dec 10, 2009 (available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8405334.stm, last viewed on August 1, 2011). 
33
  See discussion in Part II.C, infra. 
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intermediaries within cyberlaw is further emphasized by the power these 
intermediaries can wield over the user experience thorugh their ability to 
control the software code that enables online interaction and their ability to 
monitor online conduct.   
 
Intermediaries can control the user experience by regulating initial user 
access through passwords and other encryption technologies.  Additionally, 
they can control and monitor all aspects of the user experience on their 
platforms by manipulating the underlying software code.34  An avatar in 
Second Life can only be – and do - what the software will support.  Initially, 
Second Life did not provide skin colors for avatars outside the Caucasian 
range.  The game now supports the creation of additional tones – or 
“skins”35 - for participants who want their avatars to appear as African 
American, Native American, or Asian, for example.  But presumably if 
Linden Laboratories, the creators of Second Life, objected to the creation of 
different skin colors, they could disable features of the software that allow 
users to create such skins. 
 
Intermediaries are the most effective choke points for enforcing desired 
norms of behavior online either through their own policies or through the 
enforcement of legal rules, or a combination of both.36  Judicial orders 
directed at intermediaries are much more likely to result in effective relief to 
plaintiffs than orders against often globally dispersed, impecunious private 
actors with limited to no control over the flow of harmful information once 
it has been initially uploaded to a website.37  An order requiring a major 
online intermediary – such as Facebook or YouTube – to remove 
defamatory or copyright infringing content, for example, is much more 
likely to be effective in practice than an attempt to seek out any number of 
private individuals in various jurisdictions who may be responsible for 
posting the infringing content in the first place.38   
                                                 
34
  See supra note 16. 
35
  See http://secondlife.com/destinations/fashion/skins, last viewed on August 1, 2011 
(demonstrating ways to customize skin and body shapes in Second Life). 
36
  Lipton, supra note 31, at 936-941 (evaluating rules of conduct promulgated by 
online service providers and limitations to their effective enforcement). 
37
  Jacqueline Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1103, 
1139 (2011) (“Laws per se suffer from difficulties of identifying an anonymous or 
pseudonymous defendant and having effective jurisdiction reach over the defendant…. 
Even if plaintiffs can identify their defendants – which may require an expensive and time 
consuming court order – they are often judgment-proof.”) 
38
 A court order against an intermediary will not be a perfect solution given the 
tendency for information to jump from website to website online, but it will be more 
effective than an order against one or more private individuals. 
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B.  Direct Versus Indirect Liability for Internet Intermediaries 
 
The power and prominence of intermediaries underscore the importance 
of regulating these entities as a focal point for cyberlaw.  By the same 
token, it is important that intermediaries, particularly those providing novel 
services, are not over-regulated to the point that online innovation is chilled.  
Lawmakers are routinely faced with difficult questions involving the 
regulation of powerful, and often extremely innovative, intermediaries.  
These questions include determining when an intermediary should be held 
liable for harmful online conduct instigated by another.  Increasingly, 
Congress has drafted laws aimed specifically at the role of online 
intermediaries in an attempt to create clearer ex ante guidelines to balance 
technological innovation against the need to protect existing legal rights – 
such as copyright, trademarks, personal reputations etc.  Obvious examples 
include the ISP safe harbor provisions in the copyright act39 and the 
Communications Decency Act respectively,40 as well as the contentious 
provisions of SOPA.41 
 
The problem with many current cyberlaw texts is that questions of 
intermediary liability are scattered throughout chapters focusing on specific 
heads of tortious liability – copyright, trademark, defamation etc.  This 
organization tends to discourage a focus on the central question involving 
the rights and obligations of intermediaries across discrete subject matter 
areas.  Questions about intermediary liability for copyright infringement 
will be found in a textbook chapter on copyright law, while intermediary 
liability for defamation and privacy will typically be discussed in a free 
speech, privacy, or general tort chapter.  It would make much more sense 
for discussions of intermediary liability to be considered together across all 
relevant fields of law – copyright, trademark, defamation, privacy, bullying, 
harassment etc.  Taking this approach, important synergies inherent in the 
role of intermediaries could be drawn out, and more consistent and 
predictable legal rules developed. 
 
For example, one question that plagues cyberlaw is the increasing 
difficulty inherent in ascertaining when an intermediary should be held 
primarily, as opposed to secondarily, liable for an online wrong.  Where a 
wrong is committed in the physical world – such as theft, conversion, 
negligence, or battery – the identity of the primary wrongdoer is readily 
                                                 
39
  17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a), 512(c).  See discussion in Part II.C, infra. 
40
  Communications Decency Act of 1996, § 230.  See discussion in Part II.C, infra. 
41
  See supra note 2. 
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apparent, and it is usually not an intermediary.  Even if a third party 
facilitates the wrong, the actual wrongdoer is generally easy enough to 
distinguish from that third party.  If I steal from you and deposit the 
proceeds into my bank account, the bank may be secondarily liable for 
some aspects of my conduct42 and may be subject to a garnishment order in 
relation to the stolen funds.43  However, it is clear that the bank – the 
intermediary – is not the primary wrongdoer.  I am.   
 
Online, however, it is often difficult to discern who is most 
appropriately identified as the primary wrongdoer.  In Playboy Enterprises 
v Netscape, for example, it was unclear to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals whether the Netscape search engine should be regarded as a 
primary or secondary infringer of Playboy’s trademarks.44  Netscape’s 
advertising system allowed its paying advertisers to link their 
advertisements to terms pre-identified by Netscape as common search terms 
in the advertiser’s field.  Thus, a dog food company might pay to have its 
advertisements keyed to search results when an Internet user enters a search 
query related to dogs.45   
 
Playboy complained that Netscape included Playboy’s trademarked 
terms “playboy” and “playmate” for keying advertisements related to adult 
entertainment.46  Some of the resulting advertisements were not clearly 
labeled as to whether they were officially related to Playboy’s business.47  
An Internet user clicking on an ad might incorrectly assume he or she was 
dealing with Playboy or an unaffiliated entity providing similar services.  A 
successful trademark infringement action requires consumers of a product 
or service to be confused about the source of that product or service.48  
                                                 
42
  William Blair, Secondary Liability of Financial Institutions for the Fraud of Third 
Parties, 30 HONG KONG L.J. 74 (2000) (noting the basis upon which secondary liability is 
often imposed on banks and financial institutions in British-based common law systems). 
43
  Allen Myers, Untangling the Safety Net: Protecting Federal Benefits from Freezes, 
Fees, and Garnishment, 66 WASH & LEE L. REV. 371, 375-380 (2009) (explaining the basis 
and nature of a typical garnishment order filed against a bank). 
44
  Playboy Enterprises v Netscape, 354 F. 3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
45
  Id. at 1022-1023 (“Keying allows advertisers to target individuals with certain 
interests by linking advertisements to pre-identified terms.  To take an innocuous example, 
a person who searches for a term related to gardening may be a likely customer for a 
company selling seeds.  Thus, a seed company may pay to have its advertisement displayed 
when searchers enter terms related to gardening.”) 
46
  Id., at 1022-1023 (describing the nature of the plaintiff’s claim). 
47
  Id., at 1023 (“[Plaintiff] introduced evidence that the adult-oriented banner ads 
displayed on defendants’ search results pages are often graphic in nature and are 
confusingly labeled or not labeled at all.”) 
48
 Id., at 1024 (“The ‘core element of trademark infringement,’ the likelihood of 
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Playboy thus claimed infringement with respect to the ambiguously 
presented advertisements keyed to the terms “playboy” and “playmate”. 
 
While ultimately holding Netscape liable for infringement, the Ninth 
Circuit judges were unsure as to whether Netscape was best described as a 
primary or a secondary infringer of Playboy’s marks.49  In many ways, 
secondary liability for Internet intermediaries makes sense in the most 
contexts.  Intermediaries, by definition, are third parties who facilitate 
activities between principal actors.   
 
However, online the lines are blurred between primary and secondary 
actors largely because intermediaries physically control the software code 
that enables primary actors to engage in wrongful online conduct.  The 
Ninth Circuit court in Netscape court did not resolve the issue of primary 
versus secondary liability, holding that Netscape was liable for infringement 
on one basis or the other and that there was no need to determine which.50   
 
One could convincingly argue either way.  It is easy to suggest that the 
advertisers competing with the plaintiff were primarily liable for 
infringements because they were the ones who drafted the confusing ads 
that were then keyed to the plaintiff’s trademarks.  Alternatively, one could 
argue that Netscape should be primarily liable because of its choice of the 
keywords it coded into the system and its broadcasting of the confusing 
advertisements in search results.   
 
While the characterization of Netscape as a primary or secondary 
infringer had no practical impact on the decision in this case, in other cases 
the question of primary versus secondary liability for Internet intermediaries 
has taken on greater significance.  For example, in Cartoon Network v CSC 
Holdings, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was tasked with ascertaining 
whether the provider of an interactive digital video recorder (DVR) was 
primarily or secondarily liable for copyright infringement with respect to 
content copied to its servers at the request of its customers.51   
 
                                                                                                                            
confusion, lies at the center of this case.”). 
49
  Id. (“the parties dispute whether a direct or a contributory theory of liability applies 
to defendants’ actions.  We conclude that defendants are potentially liable under one theory 
and that we need not decide which one.”) 
50
  Id. (“Whether the defendants are directly or merely contributorily liable proves to 
be a tricky question. However, we need not decide that question here. We conclude that 
defendants are either directly or contributorily liable. Under either theory, [plaintiff’s] case 
may proceed. Thus, we need not decide this issue.”) 
51
  Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121 (2008). 
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Like Playboy v Netscape, the facts of this case are unique to cyberspace.  
They simply could not have arisen in the context of pre-digital video 
recording technologies.  In the good old days of Betamax and VHS tape 
recorders, it was clear that any primary infringements – unauthorized copies 
of protected content – were made by owners of video recorders.52  The 
providers of the copying technology were not involved in the primary 
infringements because they did not decide which programs were recorded, 
when, or how often.53  They did not even know what programs were being 
recorded by their customers.   
 
These pre-digital intermediaries merely provided the technology that 
enabled copying.  The Supreme Court in 1984 stated as much in the seminal 
case of Sony v Universal City Studios, holding that Sony, as the 
manufacturer of the Betamax video tape recorder, might be held secondarily 
liable for infringements of copyrighted works carried out by its customers if 
the customers were primary infringers.54  The court found no primary 
infringement on the part of the customers by virtue of the application of the 
fair use defense.55 
 
However, in Cartoon Network, the Second Circuit court faced the 
problem of consumer copying anew in the digital context, the technology 
enabling copying to now occur remotely over a network.  The DVR service 
in Cartoon Network mimicked the functionality of the analog video 
recorder under consideration in Sony, but technically operated quite 
differently.  As with a set-top video recorder, the DVR service provided by 
the defendant – Cablevision – allowed its customers to record programs 
from the television.  However, unlike analog recorders, Cablevision’s 
service enabled copies to be made remotely and stored on Cablevision’s 
servers.56  Thus, Cablevision itself physically made the infringing copies of 
protected television programs at its customers’ request and stored on its 
own servers.57   
 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Cablevision was not a 
                                                 
52
  Sony v University City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,  446-7 (1984) (characterizing Sony as 
having no direct involvement with those who copy programs without authorization). 
53
  Id. 
54
  Id. 
55
  Id., at 454-455 (holding that the copying by owners of DVRs was authorized time 
shifting and thus covered by the fair use defense to copyright infringement) 
56
  Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121, 124-125 (2008) (describing the 
operation of Cablevision’s remote DVR system). 
57
  Id 
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direct copyright infringer.58  According to the court, if there was any 
infringement, it was the users of the service who effectively made the 
copies by ordering Cablevision’s servers to record them.59  These users 
were unlikely to be held liable as direct infringers because of the Sony 
decision.  In Sony, the Supreme Court had held that television audiences did 
not infringe copyrights when they recorded programs for later viewing.60  
This practice was labeled “time shifting” and was considered by a majority 
of the Supreme Court to be a fair use of the copyrighted work.61  Assuming 
that Cablevision’s customers were largely engaged in time-shifting, the 
Second Circuit was correct in suggesting that there would be no primary 
infringement for which Cablevision could be secondarily liable.62   
 
While this result seems logical, the Second Circuit had to go to some 
lengths in its reasoning to avoiding finding Cablevision liable as a direct 
infringer.  Unlike the old Sony Betamax video recorders, Cablevision did in 
fact make actual copies of protected works at its customers’ instigation.  
Further, unauthorized reproduction of protected works attracts strict liability 
under the copyright act.63  The Second Circuit avoided the direct 
infringement result largely by reading a volition requirement into the 
copyright act that doesn’t literally appear in the statute.64  Following an 
                                                 
58
  Id., at 133 (“We conclude only that on the facts of this case, copies produced by the 
RS-DVR system are ‘made’ by the RS-DVR customer, and Cablevision's contribution to 
this reproduction by providing the system does not warrant the imposition of direct 
liability.”) 
59
  Id. 
60
 Sony v Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (“One may search the 
Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected representatives of the millions of people 
who watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing 
at home, or have enacted a flat prohibition against the sale of machines that make such 
copying possible.”) 
61
  Id., at 454 (“we must conclude that this record amply supports the District Court's 
conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use”). 
62
  Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121, 130 (2008) (“The question is who 
made this copy. If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs' theory of direct infringement succeeds; if it 
is the customer, plaintiffs' theory fails because Cablevision would then face, at most, 
secondary liability, a theory of liability expressly disavowed by plaintiffs.”)  
63
  JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION:  COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU, 13 (2011) 
(“copyright law is a strict liability regime with no mens rea requirement for liability”). 
64
 Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121, 131 (2008) (“When there is a 
dispute as to the author of an allegedly infringing instance of reproduction, Netcom and its 
progeny direct our attention to the volitional conduct that causes the copy to be made. 
There are only two instances of volitional conduct in this case: Cablevision's conduct in 
designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce a copy, and a 
customer's conduct in ordering that system to produce a copy of a specific program. In the 
case of a VCR, it seems clear-and we know of no case holding otherwise-that the operator 
of the VCR, the person who actually presses the button to make the recording, supplies the 
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earlier Internet intermediary copyright case, the Second Circuit continued to 
chip away at the strict liability basis of copyright infringement in order to 
reach the desired result, a result that was consistent with the spirit of the 
earlier Sony case, if not the technical reality.65 
 
Questions of primary versus secondary liability for intermediaries come 
up again and again in different contexts online,66 and are often resolved 
inconsistently, partly due to the failure of judges and scholars to focus on 
synergies between the role of intermediaries across different fields of law.  
The cyberlaw of the future should focus on the role of the Internet 
intermediary to enable discussions about primary versus secondary liability 
to be examined consistently within a cohesive theoretical framework across 
discrete areas of law.  It may be that a general presumption of secondary, 
rather than primary, liability makes sense for intermediaries because of their 
nature as ‘middlemen’ facilitating the conduct of others.  However, even 
within the context of intermediary secondary liability, significant challenges 
arise. 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
necessary element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct 
from the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe that an RS-DVR customer is 
sufficiently distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability as a direct infringer on a 
different party for copies that are made automatically upon that customer's command.”)  
See also discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Cyberspace, Exceptionalism, and the Role of 
Intent in Copyright Infringement, 13 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF ENTERTAINMENT & 
TECHNOLOGY LAW 767, 791 (2011) (“The Cartoon Network court employed an approach 
adopted in at least one earlier Internet case involving individual copying that had been 
enabled by an Internet service provider.  The earlier case had imposed a ‘volition’ 
requirement in the context of direct infringement.  In other words, the plaintiff needed to 
prove that the defendant’s conduct was volitional rather than a largely automated 
technological process.  This volition requirement may be seen as a judicial gloss on strict 
liability to accommodate technological innovation.”) [hereinafter, Cyberspace 
Exceptionalism]. 
65
  Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121, 130 (2008), citing Religious 
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995). 
66
  Playboy Enterprises v Netscape, 354 F. 3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussion of 
primary versus secondary liability of search engine in the trademark infringement context); 
Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121, 130 (2008) (discussion of primary versus 
secondary liability of video recording service provider in the copyright infringement 
context); Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v Roommate.com, 521 F. 3d 1157 
(9th Cir. 2008) (discussing whether an online housemate matching service could be held 
primarily liability for content posted by customers that allegedly infringed fair housing 
legislation). 
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C.  Questions of Secondary Liability 
 
In the early days of the Internet, legal questions about intermediary 
liability tended to revolve around ISPs that provided bulletin boards and 
other basic communications forums.67  Courts were asked whether 
providers of such forums could be held liable for content posted by their 
members and, if so, on what basis.68  The most common claims in the late 
1990s related to defamation and copyright.69  
 
In the absence of a unified cyberlaw field focusing on ISP liability 
issues in the 1990s, courts and legislators took a silo-ed approach to 
questions of ISP liability, considering each situation largely within the 
context of the distinct legal wrong involved.  Thus, lawmakers may have 
missed significant critical points in the development of Internet law to 
ensure a systematic consideration of principles of Internet intermediary 
liability.  The law on ISP liability for defamation and copyright evolved, 
first through common law, and later through legislation, in a piecemeal 
fashion.  Today it is difficult to reconcile the principles of ISP liability for 
defamation with those of ISP liability for copyright infringement.  
 
In early defamation cases, for example, courts generally exempted ISPs 
from liability for defamatory comments posted by others provided that the 
ISP had not itself exercised significant editorial control over the content.70  
This soon proved problematic because it effectively penalized ISPs that 
were attempting to “do the right thing” and censor inappropriate conduct.  
                                                 
67
  Cubby v Compuserve, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (considering liability of 
ISP for allegedly defamatory content posted by its customers); Stratton Oakmont v 
Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995) (considering liability of ISP for 
allegedly defamatory comments posted by customers); Playboy Enterprises v Frena, 839 F. 
Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (considering liability of bulletin board operator for copyright 
infringements of those posting on the bulletin board); Religious Technology Center v 
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (considering extent to which ISP and operator 
of bulletin board service could be held liable for copyright infringements of those posting 
information on the bulletin board) 
68
  Cubby v Compuserve, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (considering liability of 
ISP for allegedly defamatory content posted by its customers); Stratton Oakmont v 
Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995) (considering liability of ISP for 
allegedly defamatory comments posted by customers). 
69
  See supra, note 67. 
70
  Cubby v Compuserve, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (ISP not liable for 
defamatory content posted by others); Stratton Oakmont v Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710 
(N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995) (ISP was liable for comments posted by others because it was 
said to have exercised significant control over content through its family friendly 
monitoring practices). 
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The more active the ISP was in, say, protecting children from harmful 
material, the more likely it would be to attract legal liability.71  ISPs that 
turned a blind eye to the content of communications were more likely to 
escape legal liability than those that were pro-active about monitoring 
content.72 
 
Congress eventually intervened, enacting § 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act (CDA).  This section, in relevant part, provides that:  “No 
provider … of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”73  Courts interpreted this provision as almost a blanket 
immunity for ISPs with respect to defamatory comments posted by others.74  
In one case, an ISP was exempted from liability even though it had 
contracted with a columnist to contribute provocative content that it knew 
was likely to be defamatory.75  In another case, an ISP was held to be 
immune where it had been made aware of damaging false comments and 
had failed to remove them in a timely fashion.76  To date, ISPs have only 
been held liable as information content providers under § 230 where they 
have actually written the relevant content themselves.77  
 
The current position on ISP liability for defamation differs dramatically 
from the position on ISP liability for copyright infringement.  Initially, 
when Internet users posted copyrighted content on bulletin boards, courts 
struggled to determine whether the ISPs that provided the forums should be 
                                                 
71
  Stratton Oakmont v Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995) (holding 
family friendly ISP liable for allegedly defamatory comments posted by customers because 
of its attempts to monitor content, suggesting it should have controlled content more 
effectively). 
72
  Id., at 13 (“PRODIGY's conscious choice, to gain the benefits of editorial control, 
has opened it up to a greater liability than CompuServe and other computer networks that 
make no such choice.”) 
73
  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
74
  David Lukmire, Can the Courts Take the Communications Decency Act?  The 
Reverberations of Zeran v America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 372 (2010) 
(“Over the years, state and federal courts have interpreted section 230 expansively, 
conferring a broad immunity upon website operators that host third-party content. The 
statute has grown into a ‘judicial oak,’ with impacts far beyond its language sounding in 
defamation law and its original intent to prevent the nascent Internet from becoming a ‘red 
light district.’”) 
75
  Blumenthal v Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). 
76
  Zeran v America Online, 129 F. 3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
77
  Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v Roommate.com, 521 F. 3d 1157 
(9th Cir. 2008) (but note that this was not a defamation case, but rather a case involving 
alleged infringements of fair housing legislation). 
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held liable for those infringements.78  Ultimately, Congress stepped in to 
ensure that ISPs were not held liable for copyright infringement when they 
were acting as mere conduits or repositories for the postings of others.79   
 
Congress enacted the Online Copyright Infringement Liability 
Limitation Act (OCILLA) as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) package of 1998.  OCILLA provides a safe harbor for ISPs in the 
case of non-volitional or non-willful copying: in other words, copying that 
occurs as part of a purely technical or mechanical process and that was 
initiated by another person.80  The statute also exempts ISPs from liability 
where the ISP had no actual or constructive knowledge of the infringement, 
had not directly benefited from the infringement, and had responded 
expeditiously to a request to remove infringing content.81   
 
The ISP safe harbors for defamation and copyright were enacted around 
the same time.82  However, the respective statutes clearly follow different 
approaches.  This result is not surprising given that the drafters of OCILLA 
were focused on amending the copyright act for the digital age, while the 
drafters of the CDA were dealing with a broader statute about protecting 
children from harmful material online.83  Both statutes would have been 
incredibly challenging to draft,84 particularly in the early days of the 
Internet when it was unclear how relevant technologies would develop and 
how people would use them, and indeed what role Internet intermediaries 
would ultimately play in monitoring online communications.   
 
Nonetheless, there were significant commonalities in aim between the 
statutes, at least in the case of the ISP safe harbor provisions.  Drafters of 
both statutes were faced with the emerging role of the Internet intermediary 
                                                 
78
  Playboy Enterprises v Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (considering ISP 
liability for copyright infringement); Religious Technology Center v Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (considering copyright infringement liability of ISP and bulletin 
board operator). 
79
  17 U.S.C. § 512. 
80
  17 U.S.C. § 512(a). 
81
 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).  The statute also exempted ISPs from liability for system 
caching ie temporary housing of copies of digital information:  15 U.S.C. § 512(b). 
82
  Section 230 of the CDA was enacted in 1996 while OCILLA was enacted in 1998. 
83
  Lukmire, supra note 74, at 373-378 (describing the legislative history of the 
Communications Decency Act as being an attempt to constitutionally incentivize website 
operators to police the Internet and to prevent minors from accessing harmful content). 
84
  In fact, significant portions of the CDA (other than § 230) failed to pass 
constitutional muster in the face of First Amendment challenges.  See Reno v A.C.L.U., 521 
U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down other sections of the legislation for creating impermissibly 
overbroad constraints on online communication). 
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and questions about the impact of imposing liability upon intermediaries for 
wrongs committed by others.  However, each drafting group understandably 
focused on its own brief without examining the nature of ISP liability more 
generally. 
 
In the final analysis, it is possible to reconcile the approaches taken by 
Congress respectively in OCILLA and in § 230 of the CDA, although the 
reconciliation may be somewhat unsatisfying as an ex post facto 
rationalization.   For example, one might argue that it is easier for an ISP to 
have knowledge of a copyright infringement than of the veracity of a 
defamation claim because copyrights are generally registered85 and because 
OCILLA requires the claimant to give detailed notice to the ISP of a 
copyright claim.86  Thus, it is arguably reasonable to hold ISPs liable for 
copyright infringement on the basis of notice but to exempt them from 
defamation liability regardless of notice.  It is at least theoretically much 
easier for an ISP to make a reasonable judgment about the veracity of a 
copyright claim than about the legitimacy of a defamation claim.   
 
Of course, one could argue that if an ISP is not in a good position to 
make decisions about the merits of a defamation claim, then the ISP should 
err on the side of protecting the claimant’s reputation and should be 
exposed to liability if it fails to act.  However, this opens intermediaries up 
to potentially frivolous claims that cannot be easily verified.  If an 
intermediary is required to act on each claim by removing offending 
material – or at least investigating the merits - the resulting costs to those 
service providers may be prohibitive.  There is no easy way for an ISP to 
determine whether posted comments are defamatory or not, as opposed to a 
copyright claim where registration of a copyright is at least prima facie 
evidence of its validity.87   
 
In all contexts, Internet intermediaries are routinely put in the 
unenviable position of either erring on the side of facilitating the free flow 
of ideas online or of monitoring and policing content.  Where the content 
involves potentially infringing rights the existence of which can be 
relatively easily verified by the intermediary, it might be reasonable to 
impose liability on the intermediary if it fails to act.  In other circumstances, 
                                                 
85
 TEHRANIAN, supra note 63, at 98 (noting the necessity of registering copyrighted 
works in the United States in order to obtain meaningful judicial relief for infringement). 
86
  17 U.S.C. §(c)(3)(A). 
87
  MARHSALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, 273(5 ed, 2010) (noting 
that registration of a copyright “confers prima facie evidence of the validity of the 
copyright”). 
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liability might be less appropriate absent a showing of complicity by the 
intermediary in the wrongful conduct. 
 
One might criticize the different approaches taken between OCILLA 
and § 230 of the CDA.  In fact, it is interesting that there is so little 
commentary on the comparison between the two approaches in current 
literature.  In both defamation and copyright claims, ISPs have been put into 
the position of making difficult decisions about whether or not to act in the 
face of a complaint.  In both cases they have had to examine the extent to 
which they might be regarded as complicit in the alleged wrong.  And in 
both cases they have been put in the position of making decisions that 
impact on free expression: that is, to remove content and risk being 
criticized for censorship or to allow allegedly infringing content and risk 
being sued as complicit in the commission of an online wrong.  However, 
Congress acted in a way that misses these synergies, taking one approach 
with respect to copyrights and another with respect to defamation and other 
harmful content.   
 
D.  Benefits of a Renewed Focus on Intermediary Liability 
 
 Refocusing the cyberlaw field as a law of the intermediated information 
exchange would create an effective theoretical framework within which to 
investigate the commonalities between facially disparate areas of law like 
intermediary liability for defamation and copyright infringement.  There is a 
pressing need to develop such a theoretical framework.  New issues of 
intermediary liability are constantly arising, often requiring novel 
applications of existing legal principles.88   
 
The lack of a coherent theoretical framework governing the liability of 
Internet intermediaries for online wrongs is exemplified in debates over 
SOPA.89  This bill grants power to the Attorney General to bring actions 
against owners of websites that host content that infringes American 
intellectual property rights.90  It also imposes significant obligations on 
online service providers to comply with court orders made under the 
legislation.91  These obligations include increased policing and monitoring 
                                                 
88
  LOWE, supra note 32, at 213 (“From patent, copyright, and trademark infringement 
to click fraud to wrongful dismissal, Google spends a lot of time in court.  While it is true 
that Google makes a large target, it also is true … that it is operating in a field littered with 
uncertainties begging to be resolved in the courts of law.  Some of the lawsuits address key 
issues that could define both Google and the Internet of the future.”) 
89
  See supra note 1. 
90
  H.R. 3261 1H (112th Cong.), §102(b). 
91
  Id., §102(c). 
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of content being transmitted via their services.92  The new legal duties, if 
implemented, would place new burdens on service providers including 
search engines,93 online payments systems,94 and online advertising 
services.95 
 
While this legislation is aimed at the protection of intellectual property 
rights in particular, it covers the same issues that arise in relation to the 
enforcement of other laws in cyberspace.  It deals with finding an 
appropriate framework for imposing legal obligations on online service 
providers with respect to wrongs committed by others.  The drafters of the 
bill, like those of the legislation described in the previous sub-Part, are 
faced with the competing aims of encouraging online innovation and 
preventing online harm.  Additionally, as with the CDA and OCILLA, the 
drafters of SOPA have latched on to the reality that online service providers 
can be the most effective choke points in online interaction to interrupt the 
flow of infringing or harmful communications.   
 
Lobbyists for free speech and privacy argue that SOPA strikes the 
balance too heavily in favor of protecting proprietary content and will 
negatively impact the online marketplace of information and ideas.96  Those 
representing the digital content industries take the view that legislation 
aimed at blocking the online flow of infringing content is necessary to 
protect innovation in digital content production and distribution.97  As with 
the CDA and OCILLA, the online intermediaries effectively become the 
meat in the sandwich between those who advocate free speech and privacy, 
and those who seek to prevent intellectual property infringement.  A more 
comprehensive and cohesive theoretical framework within which to 
consider the appropriate role for online service providers in these contexts 
would be extremely helpful in furthering more balanced drafting of 
legislation such as SOPA. 
 
Of course, SOPA has been drafted in its current form in the context of 
existing caselaw dealing with the role of online intermediaries for the 
intellectual property infringements of others.  This caselaw may not have 
given Congress particularly effective guidance in drafting legislation aimed 
                                                 
92
  Id. 
93
  Id., §102(c)(2)(B). 
94
  Id., §102(c)(2)(C). 
95
  Id., §102(c)(2)(D). 
96
  Goodman, supra note 1 (“Information is the currency of democracy, and people will 
not sit still as moneyed interests try to deny them access.”) 
97
  Id. (describing the aims of the legislation from the point of view of copyright 
holders). 
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at balancing online information flow against the need to prevent widespread 
copyright infringement.  Two relatively recent Ninth Circuit decisions 
handed down prior to the drafting of SOPA went in two different directions 
on the potential copyright infringement liability of an Internet search engine 
and a group of electronic payments system providers respectively. 
 
The respective defendants were the Google search engine in one case, 
and the Visa online payments system in the other.98  The plaintiff in each 
case was Perfect 10, a company whose business was selling photos of nude 
models online.99  In the litigation against Google, Perfect 10 claimed 
copyright infringement in respect of unauthorized reproductions and 
displays of its copyrighted photographs that showed up in Google’s search 
results.100  Perfect 10 claimed both direct and indirect infringement, arguing 
that Google should be held responsible for its own reproductions and 
displays of the copyrighted photographs in its search engine results.101  It 
should also be held secondarily liable for the infringements by the people 
who had actually made the illegal copies in the first place where the copies 
showed up in search results.102  In the litigation against Visa, Perfect 10 
claimed only secondary liability with respect to Visa enabling payments to 
companies that sold unauthorized reproductions of Perfect 10’s protected 
photographs.103 
                                                 
98
  Perfect 10 v Google, 508 F. 3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10 v Visa, 494 F. 3d 
788 (9th Cir. 2007). 
99
  Perfect 10 v Google, 508 F. 3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Perfect 10 markets and 
sells copyrighted images of nude models. Among other enterprises, it operates a 
subscription website on the Internet. Subscribers pay a monthly fee to view Perfect 10 
images in a ‘members' area’ of the site.”) 
100
  Id., at 1159 (“Perfect 10 claims that Google’s search engine program directly 
infringes two exclusive rights granted to copyright holders: its display rights and its 
distribution rights”). 
101
  Id., at 1163 (noting that plaintiff had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case 
that Google had infringed its copyrights by reproducing copyrighted photographs as 
thumbnail images); but see 1168 (court ultimately held that Google’s reproductions of the 
images as thumbnails in its search engine results page was a fair use and therefore non-
inringing). 
102
  Id., at 1170 (describing the need to evaluate: “Perfect 10's arguments that Google is 
secondarily liable in light of the direct infringement that is undisputed by the parties: third-
party websites' reproducing, displaying, and distributing unauthorized copies of Perfect 
10's images on the Internet”). 
103
  Perfect 10 v Visa, 494 F. 3d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Perfect 10, Inc. (Perfect 10) 
sued Visa International Service Association, MasterCard International Inc., and several 
affiliated banks and data processing services (collectively, the Defendants), alleging 
secondary liability under federal copyright … law …. It sued because Defendants continue 
to process credit card payments to websites that infringe Perfect 10's intellectual property 
rights after being notified by Perfect 10 of infringement by those websites.”) 
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With respect to the secondary liability claims, the court ultimately held 
that Google could potentially be contributorily liable for the copyright 
infringements, but that there were factual matters to be reconsidered on 
remand.104  However, with respect to Visa, the court held no secondary 
liability on the basis that Visa’s activities were too far removed from the 
primary infringements to be regarded as contributing to those 
infringements.105   In distinguishing the Google case, the court noted in Visa 
that: “The salient distinction is that Google’s search engine itself assists in 
the distribution of infringing content to Internet users, while [Visa’s] 
payments systems do not.”106  The majority in Visa admitted that Visa 
assists in making the primary infringements profitable, but they 
distinguished the profitability of the infringement from the distribution and 
availability of infringing images online.107   
 
The Visa case included a strong dissent from Judge Kozinski who 
argued that the payments system provides more than a mere economic 
incentive to infringe, but actually provides “an essential step in the 
infringement process”.108  In Judge Kozinski’s view, without the payments 
                                                 
104
  Perfect 10 v Google, 508 F. 3d 1146, 1172-1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Google could be 
held contributorily liable if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were 
available using its search engine, could take simple measures to prevent further damage to 
Perfect 10’s copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps.  The district court did not 
resolve the factual disputes over the adequacy of Perfect 10’s notices to Google and 
Google’s responses to those notices.  Moreover, there are factual disputes over whether 
there are reasonable and feasible means for Google to refrain from providing access to 
infringing images.  Therefore, we must remand this claim to the district court for further 
consideration whether Perfect 10 would likely succeed in establishing that Google was 
contributorily liable …”) 
105
  Perfect 10 v Visa, 494 F. 3d 788, 796 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The credit card companies 
cannot be said to materially contribute to the infringement in this case because they have 
no direct connection to that infringement. Here, the infringement rests on the reproduction, 
alteration, display and distribution of Perfect 10's images over the Internet. Perfect 10 has 
not alleged that any infringing material passes over Defendants' payment networks or 
through their payment processing systems, or that Defendants' systems are used to alter or 
display the infringing images. … While Perfect 10 has alleged that Defendants make it 
easier for websites to profit from this infringing activity, the issue here is reproduction, 
alteration, display and distribution, which can occur without payment.”)  
106
  Id., at 797. 
107
 Id. (“[Visa] do[es], as alleged, make infringement more profitable, and people are 
generally more inclined to engage in an activity when it is financially profitable.  However, 
there is an additional step in the causal chain:  Google may materially contribute to 
infringement by making it fast and easy for third parties to locate and distribute infringing 
material, whereas [Visa] make[s] it easier for infringement to be profitable, which tends to 
increase financial incentives to infringe, which in turn tends to increase infringement.”) 
108
  Id., at 812.  
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systems, infringement would be almost impossible.109  Clearly, there is 
room for disagreement as to where to draw the secondary liability line when 
it comes to Internet gatekeepers.  An appropriately reconceptualized 
cyberlaw field would provide a much needed theoretical framework within 
which to reconsider these issues.   
 
While providing accessible and innovative services to enable 
individuals to interact more efficiently and effectively, online service 
providers are subject to the possibility of secondary liability claims for 
activities about which they have little actual knowledge:  including 
copyright, defamation, trademark infringement, bullying, harassment 
liability etc.  Courts are likely to be faced with questions about what an 
intermediary could or should have known about the activities of a primary 
infringer in a number of these different contexts.  These questions are not 
unique to copyright law.   
 
As intermediaries’ business operations continue to scale up, they may be 
less and less sure of what all their users are doing.  In remanding the Google 
case back to the lower court, the Ninth Circuit was mindful that it had 
insufficient information about the realities of Google’s position to make a 
meaningful determination on contributory liability for copyright 
infringement.  All it held was that liability was possible on this basis, but it 
wanted the lower court to look more closely at the position Google was 
actually in, and whether Google realistically had the capabilities to detect 
and prevent copyright infringement.110 
 
Courts and legislatures will continue to face questions of the secondary 
liability of online intermediaries in copyright and other areas of law.  
However, to date these issues have been tackled on a subject matter basis.  
SOPA and OCILLA are both confined to the position of Internet 
intermediaries with respect to copyright infringements.  Section 230 of the 
                                                 
109
 Id.(“My colleagues recognize, as they must, that helping consumers locate 
infringing content can constitute contributory infringement, but they consign the means of 
payment to secondary status…. But why is locating infringing images more central to 
infringement than paying for them?  If infringing images can’t be found, there can be no 
infringement; but if infringing images can’t be paid for, there can be no infringement 
either…”) 
110
  Perfect 10 v Google, 508 F. 3d 1146, 1172-1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (“there are factual 
disputes over whether there are reasonable and feasible means for Google to refrain from 
providing access to infringing images. Therefore, we must remand this claim to the district 
court for further consideration whether Perfect 10 would likely succeed in establishing that 
Google was contributorily liable for in-line linking to full-size infringing images under the 
test enunciated today.”) 
[15-Feb-12] Intermediated Information Exchange 25 
CDA, on the other hand, considers similar issues with respect to other 
online conduct such as defamation and other forms of harmful speech 
outside the intellectual property arena.111   
 
Current cyberlaw scholars tend to consider each specific question within 
a vacuum or silo without looking at the role of Internet intermediaries more 
broadly.  As cyberlaw is in reality the law of intermediated information 
exchange, a debate that is refocused more specifically on the role of online 
intermediaries has a better chance of achieving consistency of application 
than the current piecemeal approach.   
 
E.  Responsibilities to Unmask Online Wrongdoers 
 
Another advantage of refocusing cyberlaw on the role of Internet 
intermediaries would be that such a move would provide a theoretical 
paradigm within which to consider the unique role of intermediaries in 
terms of their potential to unmask online wrongdoers.  Internet 
intermediaries are often in the position of being the only entity within a 
given dispute capable of identifying or locating an online wrongdoer even 
in circumstances where the intermediary itself is not complicit in 
committing the harm.  Much online communication is anonymous or 
pseudonymous.112  Thus, victims of online wrongs cannot identify the 
person or persons engaging in harmful conduct.     
 
However, again, the law must strike a delicate balance between ensuring 
that intermediaries assist in unmasking wrongdoers while at the same time 
avoiding a chilling effect on intermediaries’ business models.  If 
intermediaries are too often and too easily required to identify customers 
who wish to remain anonymous, this will likely result in a chilling of online 
activity.  This has been one of the most marked criticisms of SOPA – 
involving the extent to which the legislation would require online service 
providers to take responsibility for policing online wrongdoers and 
potentially infringing the privacy and autonomy of their customers in the 
process.113   
 
                                                 
111
  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2)(“ Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or 
expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”) 
112
  Lipton, supra note 37, at 1114 (“The anonymity provided by the Internet may 
increase the volume of abusive conduct because it may encourage individuals who would 
not engage in such conduct offline to do so in the anonymous virtual forum provided by the 
Internet.”) 
113
  H.R. 3261 1H (112th Cong.), § 102(c). 
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There is a delicate balance to be struck between the obligations of 
Internet intermediaries to law enforcement and to their customer bases.114  
Internet users may be loathe to communicate online for fear of being 
unmasked if there is excessive obligation on intermediaries to police their 
activities.115  Intermediaries may also falter in the marketplace if they 
cannot protect their customers’ privacy sufficiently.116  The requirement 
that intermediaries stand ready to unmask their customers also imposes 
costs on intermediaries related to obtaining and maintaining sufficiently 
detailed records to identify customers when necessary.   
 
To date, courts have developed rules to determine the circumstances 
under which an Internet intermediary may be ordered to divulge the identity 
of an alleged defendant117 or a witness to an online wrong.118  In these 
cases, judges have had to draw lines that most appropriately balance the 
interests of an intermediary in protecting its members’ anonymity against 
the interests of a complainant.  Judges have faced these challenges in the 
context of cases involving copyright infringement,119 defamation,120 
trademark infringement,121 and complaints about reputational harm.122     
 
A broader look at these questions through the lens of Internet 
                                                 
114
  And increasingly as online service providers such as Facebook become public 
corporations, they will be faced with additional obligations to shareholders. 
115
  Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability:  Challenges to 
the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L. J. 1639, 1641 (1995) (noting the trend 
for Internet users to desire to speak without censorship and to take advantage of the 
Internet’s relative anonymity in doing so) 
116
  Id., at 1671 (“The Networld has an abundance of opportunities for full and 
uninhibited speech. The difficulty has become one of offended parties seeking to inhibit the 
speech of the offending posters of messages. As the offended turn to their lawyers to 
redress their grievances, this uninhibited cauldron of opinion becomes threatened. Should 
strict liability for all electronic transmission become the accepted norm, service providers 
might scramble to hide behind contracts, waivers, monitoring of all content, and censorship 
of messages before posting …. Liability insurance would be prohibitively expensive, the 
burden of monitoring all messages before posting them too demanding, and the possibility 
of facing protracted litigation too onerous.”) 
117
 Columbia Ins. Co. v SeesCandy.Com, 18 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999); In re 
Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, 52 Va. Cir. 26 (2000); Doe I and Doe II v 
Individuals, Whose True Names Are Unknown, Civil Action No. 3:07 CV 909 (CFD), 2008 
WL 2428206 (D. Conn. June 13, 2008). 
118
  Doe v 2TheMart.Com., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wa. 2001). 
119
  In re Verizon Internet Services., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003). 
120
 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, 52 Va. Cir. 26 (2000). 
121
 Columbia Ins. Co. v SeesCandy.Com, 18 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
122
 Doe I and Doe II v Individuals, Whose True Names Are Unknown, Civil Action No. 
3:07 CV 909 (CFD), 2008 WL 2428206 (D. Conn. June 13, 2008). 
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intermediary liability more generally would enable more cohesive and 
systematic rules to develop over time.  The development of clearer rules 
about the responsibility of intermediaries to maintain and divulge 
identifying records about customers would assist in making business more 
predictable for intermediaries and their customers.  This predictability may 
also be useful to victims of online wrongs as they would gain a better ex 
ante sense of the likelihood of unmasking a potential defendant or witness 
in a given situation. 
 
The role of the Internet intermediary is effectively the foundation of 
cyberlaw, or at least it should be.  Intermediaries are necessary for all online 
interaction.  No one can communicate online without using at least one 
intermediary.  Intermediaries are the gatekeepers to all we do online.  They 
hold great power in the sense of enabling access to online communications, 
setting the parameters of online conduct through their software coding, and 
maintaining records of the identities of online actors.  They can also be the 
most effective choke points to prevent harmful online interactions. 
 
However, imposing legal responsibilities on intermediaries always 
comes at a cost.  The more duties legally imposed on intermediaries, the 
more likely the result will be a chilling of online innovation.  
Reconceptualizing cyberlaw as a field the primary focus of which is to 
address these issues would lead to significant benefits in terms of creating 
greater certainty for online service providers and their customers with 
respect to their legal rights and obligations. 
 
 
III.  JURISDICTION  
 
Any reconceptualization of the cyberlaw field should retain some focus 
on major jurisdictional challenges created by cyberspace interactions.  
Again, Internet intermediaries will often be key players in jurisdictional 
disputes as they are the parties that enable the global communications and 
they are often the easiest parties for a defendant to locate.  Additionally, a 
court order against an intermediary will likely be more effective than an 
order against often multiple individual defendants because the 
intermediaries are the choke points for communications.  If an intermediary 
is ordered to remove or monitor the flow of certain information, the result 
will be more effective than an order against a private defendant who may 
use aliases or pseudonyms,  as well as effectively being able to mask his or 
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her location, and being judgment proof.123 
 
When global communications were easily, quickly, and cheaply enabled 
in the 1990s by the widespread public take-up of the Internet, it seemed 
obvious that the major new legal issues would be jurisdictional.  The 
Internet opened up seemingly endless possibilities for litigating against 
foreign defendants, raising choice of law and choice of forum questions as 
well as foreign enforcement challenges.124  Even if a court in the plaintiff’s 
jurisdiction agreed to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant and an 
order was obtained in favor of the plaintiff, it would not always be clear that 
the order could be enforced in the foreign jurisdiction.  Particularly 
problematic have been cases where the defendant holds no assets in the 
plaintiff’s jurisdiction that might be attached as part of a judgment order.  
The ongoing litigation between Yahoo! and La Ligue contre le Racisme et 
l’Antisemitisme in France is a good example highlighting uncertainties 
about how, or indeed if, a court order from the plaintiff’s country might be 
enforced in the defendant’s country.125   
 
In the Yahoo! litigation, a French plaintiff successfully obtained a 
French court order to have Yahoo! enjoined from facilitating sales of Nazi 
memorabilia in France.126  Subsequently, Yahoo! took up the matter in 
California and attempted to obtain a declaration from the Californian courts 
that the French order could not be enforced against Yahoo!’s assets in 
California.127  To date, the Californian courts have refrained from giving a 
definitive answer to this question.128  The Californian courts have been split 
on whether the case is ripe for a decision, and as to whether the Californian 
courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over the French organization.129  
The United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari,130 so ultimately any 
                                                 
123
  See supra note 37. 
124
  See, for example, discussion in Michael Gilden, Jurisdiction and the Internet:  The 
“Real World” Meets Cyberspace, 7 ILSA J INT'L & COMP L 149 (2000). 
125
  Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme v Yahoo!, Superior Court of Paris 
(Nov. 20, 2000). 
126
  Id. 
127
 Yahoo! v La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (2006). 
128
  Id., at 1224 (“An eight-judge majority of the en banc panel holds… that the district 
court properly exercised specific personal jurisdiction over defendants LICRA and UEJF 
…. A three-judge plurality of the panel concludes … that the suit is unripe for decision ….. 
When the votes of the three judges who conclude that the suit is unripe are combined with 
the votes of the three dissenting judges who conclude that there is no personal jurisdiction 
over LICRA and UEJF, there are six votes to dismiss Yahoo!'s suit.”) 
129
  Id. 
130
  La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme v. Yahoo!., 547 U.S. 1163 (2006) 
(denying cert.). 
[15-Feb-12] Intermediated Information Exchange 29 
decision made will be in a lower court in California.     
 
Jurisdictional questions are of course not new to cyberspace.  However, 
the Internet raises new challenges for conflicts of law by its very nature.  
When addressing jurisdictional issues in cyberspace, courts have often 
complicated their analyses by focusing on the hardware aspects of the 
Internet.  For example, at a loss for guidance on how to ascertain whether a 
defendant could be said to have purposefully availed herself of the 
plaintiff’s forum,131 early cyberspace cases tended to focus on the location 
of physical computer servers.132  This approach led to random and 
unpredictable results because of the nature of the Internet.133  The whole 
point of the network is that electrons flow relatively randomly through 
cables (and now wirelessly) to avoid a single point of failure bringing down 
the entire network.134  Thus, premising jurisdictional queries on electron 
flows is unlikely to lead to principled or predictable legal rules.   
 
One reason for the tendency to focus on the physical aspects of the 
network derived from difficulties inherent in the other obvious option – to 
consider where the defendant actually engaged in the harmful conduct.  
When the defendant’s conduct is an online communication, and that 
communication is accessible globally, the purposeful availment inquiry is 
not very meaningful.135  If a defendant posts, say, a defamatory comment 
about a plaintiff on a blog that is accessible globally, is it fair to say that the 
defendant has purposely availed herself of the jurisdiction of the entire 
world?136 
                                                 
131
  Purposeful availment is a prong of a specific personal jurisdiction inquiry and 
focuses on the defendant’s activities within the plaintiff’s forum.  See, for example, 
discussion of the concept in Yahoo! v La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 
F.3d 1199, 1205-1207 (2006).  
132
  See, for example, Bochan v La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Va. 1999) 
(personal jurisdiction hinged on fortuitous location of servers accessed by defendants). 
133
  Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech:  A First 
Amendment Catch-22, 75 TUL. L. REV. 87, n 38 (2000) (“The TCP/IP protocols break 
down information transmitted on to the Internet into packets and reassemble it at its 
destination …. This allows the Internet to operate as a packet-switched network where the 
various data packets may travel different routes to reach the same destination ….. This 
design allows information to be transmitted through the Internet at faster speeds than 
circuit-switched networks, where, once a connection is made, that part of the network is 
dedicated only to that connection.”) 
134
  Id. 
135
  See supra note 131. 
136
  Dow Jones v Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56 (10 Dec. 2002), at para. 54 (noting 
defamation defendant’s concern about being haled into court in any jurisdiction in which 
its online publications were accessed). 
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Another alternative is to create a blanket rule that the appropriate 
jurisdiction for litigation is the place where the plaintiff suffers harm.  
Several courts have taken this approach,137 and it certainly seems logical at 
least from the plaintiff’s point of view.  One could easily argue that 
plaintiffs in, say, defamation suits should not have to go to foreign courts to 
sue defendants who may be taking advantage of their geographical distance, 
or from more lenient defamation laws in a particular jurisdiction. 
 
However, erring on the side of the plaintiff’s jurisdiction may not be 
particularly fair to the online defendant. If a defendant is potentially to be 
held liable for any comments made online under the  laws of any 
jurisdiction in which a plaintiff resides or does business, it may be 
impossible for that defendant to protect itself from unexpected foreign 
litigation.  The reality is that many defendants today do not even know 
where a plaintiff is located or where she might suffer harm. 
 
The fact that defendants could face significant risks of litigation in 
foreign jurisdictions under a rule that favored the plaintiff’s jurisdiction 
may ultimately chill much online speech.  Defamation defendants have 
argued against such a rule in past litigation.138  These concerns come into 
sharp relief in situations where defendants are increasingly amateur 
journalists and social commentators, rather than large scale media 
conglomerates, as is increasingly the case online.139  Small individual 
defendants are less likely than a large media outlet to possess the 
wherewithal to defend proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction.   
 
While there are a number of counter-arguments to concerns about 
unfairness to defendants,140  the point of this discussion is not to identify the 
                                                 
137
  Id., at para. 44 (“ordinarily, defamation is to be located at the place where the 
damage to reputation occurs.  Ordinarily that will be where the material which is alleged to 
be defamatory is available in comprehensible form assuming, of course, that the person 
defamed has in that place a reputation which is thereby damaged.”); Calder v Jones, 465 
U.S. 783 (1984) (granting jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant with respect to a 
defamation action that harmed the plaintiff – actress Shirley Jones – in California). 
138
  Gutnick v Dow Jones, VSC 305, para. 56 (Aug. 28, 2001) (aff’d, Dow Jones v 
Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56 (10 Dec. 2002)) (noting American publishers significant concerns 
at being haled into court in Australia for an article it published allegedly defaming an 
Australian resident). 
139
  The observation that journalism is become more of an amateur sport in the Internet 
age is made forcible in:  ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR (2007). 
140
 Dow Jones v Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56, para. 53 (10 Dec. 2002) (arguing that 
damages award will only be made in a defamation case where the plaintiff realistically has 
a reputation to harm in the place where publication is received); para. 56 (noting that 
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correct rule on personal jurisdiction in cyberspace.  Rather, it is to 
demonstrate that cyberspace raises unique challenges in terms of 
jurisdiction.  It is necessary within the cyberlaw field to investigate factors 
that differentiate cyberspace from physical space in the context of these 
jurisdictional challenges. 
 
Unlike physical world publications, information disseminated over the 
Internet can generally be received anywhere in the world, subject only to 
technological limitations such as firewalls and encryption.  Thus the default 
position in Internet publication is effectively opposite to that in the physical 
world.  Online information defaults to being published to everyone globally 
whereas in the physical world, information is only published to those to 
whom the publisher has specifically directed it.  Thus, the risk of being 
haled into court in an unexpected foreign jurisdiction is significantly higher 
for a defendant in an Internet case than in a physical world case.  SOPA 
itself recognizes the problem inherent in global online communications 
through its attempt to impose monitoring obligations on domestic ISPs to 
limit infringing activities conducted or facilitated by foreign actors.141 
 
The Internet may raise additional challenges related to jurisdiction.  In 
Internet-based litigation, there is a high risk that the initial focus of the 
litigation will be on jurisdictional issues, rather than on the substance of the 
plaintiff’s complaint.  Because of the disproportionately high number of 
jurisdictional issues in cyberspace cases in comparison with physical world 
cases, a greater number of cyberspace cases might be disposed of at the 
jurisdictional stage without ever getting to a determination of the parties’ 
substantive rights.  The cyberlaw field can provide a forum within which 
jurisdictional rules may be streamlined and harmonized.  Such a result 
would then minimize the time and expense necessary on initial 
jurisdictional questions, and would allow judges to focus more on exploring 
and developing the substantive rights and obligations of parties in 
cyberspace disputes. 
 
A recent example of a case in which jurisdictional considerations 
arguably detracted from an investigation of the plaintiff’s substantive rights 
                                                                                                                            
plaintiffs are unlikely to sue in a jurisdiction outside the defendant’s forum unless a 
judgment in that forum would be of real value to the plaintiff and the answer to that 
question may depend on whether, and to what extent, the defendant holds assets in the 
plaintiff’s forum); para 56 (noting that in “all except the most unusual of cases, identifying 
the person about whom material is to be published will readily identify the defamation law 
to which that person may resort”).   
141
  H.R. 3261, 1H (112th Cong.), § 102(a). 
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is Chang v Virgin Mobile.142  In this case, Chang brought inter alia a 
privacy claim against Virgin Mobile for unauthorized use of a photograph 
of her in an advertising campaign.143  Chang resided in Texas while the 
advertising campaign took place in Australia.  Virgin Mobile had found the 
picture of Chang online and copied it from a public photo-sharing website.  
Virgin Mobile had only utilized the photograph within Australia on bus 
shelter ad shells.144  It had never used the advertisement in the United 
States, nor had it posted the ad to the Internet.145  Because the defendant had 
never directed any of its conduct towards the state of Texas, the American 
court held that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.146 
 
This decision effectively left Chang without a substantive remedy.  For 
one thing, she was an individual and a teenager without the wherewithal to 
sue the defendants in Australia.  Perhaps more significantly, Australia does 
not have the same privacy torts available to plaintiffs as the United States.  
In the United States, Chang could have claimed misappropriation of her 
personal image under the misappropriation limb of privacy tort law.147  The 
misappropriation tort provides a remedy to a plaintiff where a defendant has 
made an unauthorized commercial use of her name or likeness.148  There is 
no similar tort in Australia, even if Chang had the wherewithal to litigate 
there.  Thus, the effective resolution of the dispute for lack of jurisdiction 
foreclosed the possibility of a substantive discussion of the legal nature of 
privacy rights and expectations in the global online arena. 
 
There may in fact be nothing wrong with the ultimate holding in Chang.  
                                                 
142
  2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3051 (2009). 
143
  Id., at 1 (Plaintiffs Susan Chang as next friend of Alison Chang, a minor … sued 
defendant Virgin Mobile Pty Ltd., an Australian-based company, in Texas state court on 
claims for invasion of privacy, libel, breach of contract, and copyright infringement based 
on Virgin Australia's use of an image of Alison … in its ‘Are You With Us or What’ 
advertising campaign ….). 
144
 Id., at 4 (“The advertisement was placed on bus shelter ad shells in major 
metropolitan areas in Australia.  Virgin Australia never distributed the advertisement 
incorporating Alison’s image in the United States, including Texas, and it never posted the 
photograph on its website or on any other website.”) 
145
  Id. 
146
 Id., at 26 (“Because none of the … contacts on which plaintiffs rely establishes 
sufficient minimum contacts between Virgin Australia and the state of Texas, the court 
cannot constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over Virgin Australia.”) 
147
 Restatement 2d of Torts, § 652C (One who appropriates to his own use or benefit 
the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy.”) 
148
  Id. 
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If Texas is not the correct forum for litigation, then Chang is out of luck.  
Too readily allowing plaintiffs to sue in their home jurisdictions in Internet 
cases, as noted above, may impose insurmountable burdens on defendants 
and hence on online speech more generally.   
 
However, Chang is far from the only Internet case that has been 
effectively resolved by a jurisdictional inquiry either because the plaintiff 
could not afford to sue in the defendant’s jurisdiction or because the 
plaintiff did not have an effective claim under the defendant’s law.  Many 
Internet cases have historically been effectively resolved at the jurisdiction 
determination stage, or have used the jurisdictional inquiry as a testing 
ground for considering the merits of the case.149  The proportion of Internet 
cases raising jurisdictional issues is likely to be higher than the proportion 
of non-Internet cases.  Thus, Internet law creates greater risks of 
jurisdictional inquiries detracting from the opportunity to debate and 
develop substantive legal rules.     
 
A reconceptualized cyberlaw field could contribute a more systematic 
ex ante approach to the development and application of jurisdictional 
principles in Internet-related cases.  The ability to more quickly, efficiently, 
and predictably resolve jurisdictional problems would allow greater focus 
on developing more meaningful substantive rules for online conduct.  Of 
course, jurisdictional issues both online and offline are often extremely 
difficult to resolve.  Nevertheless, the ability to focus specifically on 
cyberspace-related jurisdictional problems within a more unified theoretical 
framework is likely to assist in more principled and predictable legal 
developments. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS  
 
Rather than being dismissed as a cyber ‘law of the horse’, cyberlaw is 
much more effectively characterized as a law of the intermediated 
information exchange with global dimensions.  There is a pressing need to 
recognize a body of legal theory within which to debate the role of Internet 
intermediaries within the global information economy.  Across a variety of 
fields – intellectual property, defamation, privacy, fraud etc – Internet 
intermediaries face common problems.  Yet, there is currently no obvious 
theoretical space within to debate these issues. 
 
                                                 
149
  For example, in Cable News Network v CNNews.Com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484 (E.D. 
Va. 2001), the court avoided substantive issues relating to cybersquatting by effectively 
resolving the dispute on jurisdictional grounds. 
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Cyberlaw scholars are overly focused on subject classifications of 
disputes and fail to draw together common threads relating to Internet 
intermediaries in relation to issues such as balancing the need to encourage 
online innovation against the need to prevent online wrongs.  Thus, the 
pastiche of legislation and caselaw that has developed over the past fifteen 
years or so has been inconsistent depending on the specific subject matter at 
hand in a particular context.   
 
The cyberlaw of the future should revolve around detailed analysis of 
the legal responsibilities of Internet intermediaries in many contexts.  It 
should also incorporate jurisdictional considerations to ensure that the 
development of substantive legal principles is not hindered by overemphasis 
on procedural questions that could be more readily answered through 
development of clearer ex ante rules.     
 
Refocusing the cyberlaw field on the global nature of the conflicts and 
the central role of online intermediaries will bring forth a more cohesive 
and predictable set of rules to govern online conduct.  Once the legal rules 
are more clearly delineated in terms of ascertaining the substantive legal 
rights and obligations of intermediaries, the law can turn to other important 
issues of cyberspace regulation, such as: (a) ensuring conformity of laws 
with emerging online norms; (b) ensuring appropriate remedies for online 
harms; and, (c) creating appropriate liability rules for closed versus open 
service networks.150  However, until a theoretical framework emerges 
within which to debate these issues, we are stuck with piecemeal and 
fragmented consideration of the legal role of online intermediaries within 
disparate subjects such as intellectual property, defamation, privacy, and 
fraud.  It is time to reconceptualize the cyberlaw field with respect to what 
is truly unique about it – the fact that it governs global communications 
intermediated by one or more third parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
150
  See supra note 31 for a discussion of the distinction between closed and open 
online networks. 
